An in…nite game is approximated by restricting the players to …nite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximation of an in…nite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose …nite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the in…nite game. We provide conditions under which in…nite games admit strategic approximations.
Introduction
The analytic convenience of in…nite strategy spaces has often proven to be of value in the analysis of games. But when the presence of in…nitely many strategies is crucial -such as when discontinuities play a central role and cannot be eliminated or smoothed -doubts may arise over the robustness or even the relevance of the results. One way to attenuate such doubts is to provide a sequence of …nite approximating games whose equilibria converge to equilibria of the in…nite game, where each approximating game restricts the players to …nite subsets of their strategy spaces. This approach becomes even more convincing when there is some robustness in the choice of the approximation.
As observed by Simon (1987) , a game with in…nite strategy spaces might include strategies that are of particular strategic signi…cance to the players.
1 When this is the case, one cannot hope to well-approximate the in…nite game without eventually including such strategies in the approximation. Thus, on the one hand, good approximations cannot always be arbitrary
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1 Consider, for example, the strategy to produce zero for a …rm with …xed costs that must be paid only when production is positive.
-they sometimes must include particular strategies. On the other hand, once such strategies are identi…ed for eventual inclusion, the approximating games -i.e., the sequence of …nite strategy sets -ought otherwise be arbitrary so as to establish the irrelevance of the remaining details of the approximating sequences.
A strategic approximation is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose …nite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the in…nite game.
Our objective is to provide conditions under which strategic approximations exist. 
Preliminaries
We maintain the following assumptions throughout the paper. There are N players. Player i has pure strategy set X i ; a nonempty compact metric space. We let X = i X i and endow all product sets with the product topology. Player i's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u i : X ! R; is bounded and measurable. This de…nes a game G = (X i ; u i )
Let M i denote the space of probability measures on the Borel subsets of X i and let
The space M is a compact metric space when endowed with the Prohorov metric (see Billingsley (1968) ). 3 We will use the fact that every mixed strategy 2 (M ) in the mixed extension of G is payo¤ equivalent to its distribution m on X; i.e., u i ( ) = u i ( m) for every player i:
4 By equilibrium we shall always mean a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game under consideration. Thus, an equilibrium of G lies in M; while an equilibrium of G lies in (M ):
i is a …nite subset of X i and v i is the restriction of u i to i X 0 i : From now on, we will write u i instead of v i ; so that
: Thus, an approximating game simply restricts the players to …nite subsets of their pure strategy sets. The following concept will …gure prominently here.
2 A rather distinct approach to approximating in…nite games can be pursued by exploiting the techniques introduced in Simon and Zame (1990) , where payo¤s are sometimes rede…ned at points of discontinuity.
3 For …xed B; the real-valued function of m de…ned by m(B) is measurable. 4 Indeed, by the de…nition of m; R
for every bounded measurable function f and in particular for f = u i : De…nition 2.1. (Reny (2009) ). The game G has the …nite deviation property if whenever m 2 M is not an equilibrium of G, there is a neighborhood U of m and a …nite subset D of M such that for every m 0 2 U there is a player i andm 2 D such that u i (m i ; m
The set D is called a …nite deviation set for U: If in addition the members of D can always be chosen to have …nite supports we say that G has the …nite-support …nite deviation property.
Reny ( For later reference, we state the following result.
Theorem 2.3. (Reny (2009)) . If the mixed extension of G is better-reply secure then G has the …nite deviation property. Moreover, if the mixed extension of G is …nite-support better-reply secure then G has the …nite-support …nite deviation property. 
Strategic Approximations
Our central de…nition is the following.
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De…nition 3.1. A strategic approximation of a game G = (
is a countable set of pure strategies
i contained in X; such that whenever for each player i; X 1 i X 2 i ::: is an increasing sequence of …nite subsets of X i whose union contains X 1 i ; any limit of equilibria of the sequence of …nite games (X
Several examples illustrate the main ideas. Otherwise, a player's payo¤ is zero.
It is not di¢ cult to see that this game possesses no pure strategy equilibrium. It is not much more di¢ cult to see that there are no mixed equilibria in which either player assigns positive probability to any pure strategy. Thus, the only possible equilibria are those in which each player employs an atomless mixed strategy. Finally, any pair of atomless mixed strategies is easily seen to be an equilibrium because given the opponent's strategy a player receives an expected payo¤ of zero regardless of the pure strategy he employs.
If one attempts to approximate this in…nite game, then regardless of the …nite subsets of pure strategies one employs, the approximation will possess a pure strategy equilibrium.
Indeed, consider a …nite approximation and suppose that player 1's smallest positive strategy is x 0 and 2's is y 0 where x 0 y 0 : Then, either (x 0 ; y 0 ) is an equilibrium or player 1's …nite strategy set contains the strategy y 0 =2 in which case (y 0 =2; y 0 ) is an equilibrium. But if every …nite approximation contains a pure strategy equilibrium then any limit of such equilibria will be pure and so will not be an equilibrium of the in…nite game. This game therefore fails to possess a strategic approximation.
Nonexistence of a Strategic Approximation II.
Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Consider the following natural attempt at approximating this game. For n = 1; 2; ::; let G n be the n-th approximating game in which player 1's …nite pure strategy set is,
2 n 2 ; :::; n 2 n 2 ;
and player 2's …nite pure strategy set is,
Thus in the n-th approximating game player 1 has n 2 strategies and player 2 can choose any of the …nitely many vectors in [0; 1] 1 whose …rst n coordinates are each a member of player 1's strategy set X n and whose remaining coordinates are equal to 1. It is readily veri…ed that all equilibria of G n are in mixed strategies of the following form. Player 1 mixes uniformly among the members of X n and player 2 mixes among the members of Y n so that (i) each member of X n is equally likely to appear as one of the …rst n coordinates of the pure strategy realization, and (ii) the …rst n coordinates of any member of Y n assigned positive probability are distinct. 10 Taking the limit as n ! 1 yields, upon extraction of a weakconvergent subsequence if necessary, limit strategies in which player 1 employs Lebesgue measure on [0; 1] and player 2 employs some mixed strategy -i.e., a probability measure on the Borel subsets of [0; 1] 1 . 11 Because Lebesgue measure is atomless, this limit is an equilibrium of the original in…nite game.
Even though any limit of equilibria of the particular sequence of approximating games G n is an equilibrium of the original in…nite game, the original game fails to possess a strategic approximation because approximations of it are not robust to the inclusion of additional strategies. For example, providing player 2 with additional strategies in G n by instead
f(1; 1; 1; :::)g would permit player 2 to achieve his highest pos-9 Assigning [0; 1] its usual metric and employing the product topology on [0; 1] 1 ; the strategy spaces are compact and the payo¤ function is Borel measurable.
10 For example, for each k = 0; 1; :::; n 1 player 2 can assign probability 1=n to the vector 1 n 2 (kn + 1; kn + 2; :::; kn + n; 1; 1; 1:::):
11 Because 2's strategy space is compact in the product topology a weak -convergent subsequence is guaranteed to exist. sible payo¤ of zero in every equilibrium of G n by choosing, for example, the pure strategy 1 n 2 (1; 2; :::; n 2 ; 1; 1; 1; :::); against which player 1 cannot avoid matching one of the coordinates.
This strategy for player 2 paired with any strategy for player 1 constitutes an equilibrium of G n . Moreover, if in each G n player 1's strategy is, for example, pure then no limit of such strategies is an equilibrium of the original game. Every attempt to approximate this in…nite game will have a similar defect. Hence, this game fails to possess a strategic approximation because adding additional strategies to any approximation can produce approximating-game equilibria that are far from any of its equilibria. 
Strategic Approximations of Mixed Extensions
As a preliminary step, we apply the de…nition of a strategic approximation to the mixed
of M such that whenever, for each player i; M
is an increasing sequence of …nite subsets of M i whose union is M k to de…ne payo¤s. 13 See, e.g., Dugundji (1989, ch. XI, Th. 7.2).
of the …nite game
is the probability that player i assigns to m i in the equilibrium n of G n : 14 Suppose that n ! 2 (M ). We must show that is an equilibrium of G:
Let m n 2 M denote the distribution on X of n and let m 2 M denote the distribution on X of : By Lemma 7.1 in the appendix, m n converges to m : We claim that m is an equilibrium of G: If not, then m 2 U and there exists (
M is a …nite deviation set for U k : Because m n ! m ; we have m n 2 U k for n large enough, so that for all such n some player i n can pro…tably deviate from m n by employing a strategym
Consequently, for all n large enough,
where the …rst and third lines follow because (m n ) for all n large enough contradicts the fact that n is an equilibrium of G n : We conclude that m is an equilibrium of G: But then is an equilibrium of G because for every player i and every m i 2 M i ;
where, once again, the …rst and third lines hold because (m i ; i ) and -both in (M )
-are payo¤ equivalent to their distributions (m i ; m i ) and m on X; and the second line follows because m is an equilibrium of G:
Unfortunately G need not possesses a strategic approximation even though its mixed extension does, as the following example demonstrates.
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14 The m i 's are thus treated as pure strategies in the …nite games that approximate the mixed extension of G even though they are mixed strategies in the original game G:
15 The in…nite game in example II does not furnish such an example because its mixed extension does not possess a strategic approximation. To see this, note that for any approximation of its mixed extension one can add a pure strategy to player 1's strategy set that, according to each of the …nitely many mixed strategies available to player 2, occurs with probability zero in each coordinate of 2's realized pure strategy. This creates a pure strategy equilibrium of the approximating game in which player 1 employs the added pure strategy. The limit of such equilibria, being pure for player 1, is not an equilibrium of the in…nite game.
Nonexistence of a Strategic Approximation III.
There are three players. Players 1 and 2 participate in a …rst-price all-pay auction with a uniform tie-break rule in which it is common knowledge that the object at auction is worth one dollar to each of them. Each player can submit a bid from [0,1] -player 1 chooses x and player 2 chooses y -and they are each risk neutral.
Player 3 chooses z 2 [0; 1] 1 and always receives a payo¤ of zero regardless of the choices of x; y and z: If any coordinate of z is equal to 1's choice of x; then the outcome of the auction is null and void -i.e., neither player 1 nor player 2 pays his bid and neither player wins the object -and in addition player 1 loses a dollar. Otherwise, player 3's choice has no e¤ect.
Ignoring for the moment the presence of player 3, a standard argument establishes that there is a unique equilibrium in the all-pay auction, namely that both players 1 and 2
independently randomize according to Lebesgue measure on [0; 1]: Given these strategies, player 3's presence has no e¤ect on expected payo¤s because regardless of 3's choice of z; the probability that one of its coordinates matches 1's choice of x is zero.
In fact, every equilibrium of the 3-player game is such that players 1 and 2 choose according to Lebesgue measure, while player 3's choice of mixed strategy can be arbitrary.
This characterization follows from the fact that for any strategy of player 2, player 1 can achieve a payo¤ arbitrarily close to a best reply in the auction by employing an atomless strategy. Consequently, player 1 can, with probability one, ensure that his choice not match any coordinate of 3's choice while simultaneously achieving a payo¤ in the auction that is arbitrarily close to maximal given 2's strategy. Therefore, in any equilibrium of the 3-player game the results of the auction will stand with probability one and player 1's strategy must be a best reply in the auction. Since the results of the auction stand with probability one, player 2's strategy must also be a best reply in the auction and the argument is complete.
For the same reason as in the previous example, this game fails to possess a strategic approximation. Regardless of the attempted strategic approximation, adding to player 3's pure strategy set a pure strategy whose coordinates contain every pure strategy available to player 1 creates an equilibrium in which player 3 chooses that strategy and players 1 and 2 each choose any pure strategy. Limits of such strategies, being pure for both players 1 and 2, are not equilibria of the original game.
Finally, it can be shown that this game's mixed extension is better-reply secure and so by Theorem 2.3 this game has the …nite deviation property. Consequently, the mixed extension of this game (by Theorem 4.1), but not the game itself, possesses a strategic approximation.
16 16 The example neither relies on three players nor on in…nite-dimensional strategy spaces. All of its features can be obtained with 2 players and pure strategy sets [0,1] and [0,1] 2 where player 2's second coordinate is Our next result shows that the discrepancy is due to the failure of the game to possess the …nite-support …nite deviation property.
Strategic Approximations of G
Our …rst result on the existence of strategic approximations of G follows the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 5.1. If G has the …nite-support …nite deviation property, then G has a strategic approximation.
Proof. Maintain the same notation (i.e., U; U m ; D m etc.) and construct M 1 as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. By the …nite-support …nite deviation property, we may assume that each member of M 1 has …nite support. For each player i; let X 1 i be the countable set that is the union of the supports of all the members of M 1 i and let
We wish to show that X 1 is a strategic approximation of G:
::: be an increasing sequence of …nite subsets of X i whose union contains X 1 i , and for each n let m n be a mixed strategy equilibrium of the
and suppose that m n ! m 2 M: We must show that m is an equilibrium of G:
If not, then m 2 U and there exists (
…nite deviation set for U k : Because m n ! m ; we have m n 2 U k for n large enough, so that for all such n some player i n can pro…tably deviate from m n by employing a strategym
Moreover, because the union of the supports of the members of D k in is contained in X n in for n large enough, the pro…table deviationm n in is eventually feasible for player i n in
: This contradicts the fact that m n is an equilibrium of G n and we conclude that m is an equilibrium of G:
An immediate consequence of Theorems 2.3 and 5.1 is the following.
Corollary 5.2. If the mixed extension of G is …nite-support better-reply secure, then G has a strategic approximation.
Both Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987) use approximation techniques to establish the existence of an equilibrium. As shown in Reny (1999) , their hypotheses imply that the game's mixed extension is better-reply secure. Reny's discussion in fact demonstrates that their hypotheses imply …nite-support better-reply security. Consequently, the payo¤-irrelevant for him and is mapped onto [ k [0; 1] k using the Peano curve construction. The image of 2's second coordinate is used against player 1 as in the three-player game.
hypotheses of Corollary 5.2 weaken those of both Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987) , and so their hypotheses too imply the existence of a strategic approximation.
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Our …nal two results provide su¢ cient conditions for a better-reply secure game to be …nite-support better-reply secure and hence to have a strategic approximation. The second of the two results is implied by the …rst, but its hypotheses are simpler to check. The hypotheses of both results are satis…ed in many economic games (Bertrand, Hotelling, auctions, etc.) . Decomposem i intom i = i + i ; where i is the atomless part ofm i , and i is concentrated on a countable set. Assume that both i (X i ) and i (X i ) are nonzero. 18 De…ne the probability
Since the probability measures on X i with …nite support are dense in M i (see Billingsley (1968) ), there is a sequence f
is bounded) and lower semicontinuous on X: In addition, because w i (x) = u i (x) whenever u i ( ) is continuous at x; we have by hypothesis that,
for all x i 2 X i ;
17 In fact, the hypotheses of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) are su¢ ciently strong to guarantee that for any game satisfying them, any dense subset of the players'Euclidean strategy spaces is a strategic approximation. 18 The argument that follows is easily modi…ed to handle the cases in which one of i or i is zero.
so that
and the function of x i de…ned by both sides of (5.1) is continuous on X i :
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Because ( k i ; m i ) converges weakly to ( i ; m i ); the lower semicontinuity of w i ( ) implies,
where the second line follows from (5.1). Hence for all k large enough,
where the second line holds because w i ( ) u i ( ); the third line holds because w i ( ) is lower semicontinuous, and the fourth holds by (5.2).
Choose a sequence of …nite-support strategies
for each of the countably many x i given positive weight by i . Because u i ( ) is bounded, If for each player i and every x i 2 X i ; u i ( ) is continuous at (x i ; x i ) for all but perhaps countably many x i 2 X i ; then G admits a strategic approximation.
Remark 1. The countable discontinuity condition in Corollary 5.4 is strictly weaker than Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986) "diagonal discontinuity" restrictions on the set of discontinuities of the players'payo¤ functions.
Topological Perspectives
A rather di¤erent view to approximating in…nite games might be to insist that every countable dense subset of the players'strategy spaces constitute a strategic approximation. This point of view evidently attaches special (economic, perhaps) signi…cance to the underlying topology and gives priority to the robustness of the approximation. But if the question is purely to establish a useful sense in which the strategic character of an in…nite game can be said not to hinge on the presence of in…nitely many strategies, it is unnecessary to insist that every dense subset of strategies constitute a strategic approximation. The existence of a single strategic approximation would seem to su¢ ce and in any case this is the view proposed here.
Appendix
Lemma 7.1. Let n be a sequence in (M ) converging to : If m n 2 M is the distribution on X of n and m 2 M is the distribution on X of ; then m n converges to m :
